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USE OF MOTIONS IN LIMINE IN
CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
Attorneys frequently find themselves in situations where the opposing
counsel persistently solicits prejudicial evidence which, although logically
relevant, is not legally relevant.' When this situation arises, the attorney is
faced with the dilemma of either continually objecting to the evidence,
thereby arousing the suspicions of the jury and creating additional preju-
dice, or not objecting to the evidence, thereby waiving the right to -raise
the issue in a motion for a new trial or on appeal.2 To avoid facing this
double-edged sword, many experienced trial attorneys employ a relatively
new procedural device: the motion in limine.3 This article is intended as a
guide4 for the practicing attorney in the use of motions in limine in. civil
practice.5
Although there are different versions of the motion in limine,. it is
generally referred to as a pretrial request for "an evidentiary ruling that a
1. See E. CLEARY, McCoRMICKeS HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE
§ 185 (2d ed. 1972) for a discussion of the terms legal relevance and logical rele-
vance and for the need to discard this distinction in favor of a single relevancy
standard.
2. Comment, The Motion in Limine: Pretrial Trump Card in Civil Litiga-
tion, 27 U. FLA. L. REv. 531, 536 (1975).
3. The motion in limine is appropriate in both civil and criminal proceed-
ings. However, it is important to distinguish the motion in limine from another
motion which is used to exclude inflammatory evidence in criminal proceed-
ings-the pretrial motion to suppress. Whereas the motion in limine is based
on the trial court's inherent discretion to exclude prejudicial evidence, the motion
to suppress is based on the court's duty to exclude evidence which has been im-
properly Qbtained.
4. From his limited experience as a law clerk, the author has learned that
the motion in limine practice in Missouri is much more widespread than the re-
ported cases indicate. The suggestions contained herein are based on written
commentaries and case law, and are intended as a suggested procedure. that
will be safe for any attorney to follow. These suggestions do not attempt to pre-
sume what short-cut procedures individual courts may employ.
5. For a collection of cases, see Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 311 (1975). See generally
Davis, The Motion In Limine-A Neglected Trial Technique, 5 WASHBUm" L.J.
232 (1966); Traster, Protecting Your Client with the Motion in Limine, 22 TRIAL
L W. GuIDE 147 (1978); Comment, The Use of Motions in Limine in Civil Liti-
gation, 1977 Auz. ST. L.J. 443; Comment, Motion in Limine, 29 ARK. L. REv.
215 (1975); Comment, Motions in Limine in Washington, 9 GoNz. L. RPv. 780
(1974); Comment, The Motion in Limine: Pretrial Trump Card in Civil Litiga-
tion, 27 U. FLA. L. REv. 531 (1975); Note, The Motion in Limine-A Useful
Procedural Device, 35 MONT. L. REv. 363 (1974); Note, Civil Procedure-New
Mexico's Recognition of the Motion in Limine, 8 N.M.L. REv. 211 (1978); Note,
Pretrial Exclusionary Evidence Rulings, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 738; 20 Amt. JUt. TRYALS
441 (1973).
For an excellent account of the use of motions in limine in criminal pro-
ceedings, see Rothblatt & Leroy, The Motion in Limine in Criminal Trials: A
Technique for the Pretrial Exclusion of Prejudicial Evidence, 60 Ky. L.J. 611(1972). -
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particular piece of evidence has potentially inflammatory characteristics
or aspects that outweigh whatever materiality it possesses."8 However, the
motion in limine is better defined as "a request for a ruling on the admis-
sibility of certain evidence made at any time prior to the offer of that
evidence at trial."7 If the court determines that the potential prejudicial
effect outweighs the probative value of the evidence, it may issue an
"order directing the opposing party, his counsel and witnesses to re-
frain from introducing . . . [that] evidence, either directly or indirectly,
without first determining its admissibility outside the presence of the
jury."8 In addition to foreclosing mention of the excluded evidence dur-
ing examination of witnesses, the court's order may also preclude reference
to the prejudicial evidence in pleadings, voir dire, opening statements,
off-hand remarks by counsel, and closing arguments. 9
Authority for the use of motions in limine in most jurisdictions is
found in the trial court's inherent discretionary power to admit or ex-
clude prejudicial evidence.10 This power has evolved by case law"
rather than by specific authority from statutes or rules of procedure.12
6. 20 Am. Jui TRuLs 447-48 (1973).
7. Comment, 1977 Awiz. ST. L.J., supra note 5, at 444.
8. Comment, 29 Aim. L. REv., supra note 5, at 217. This statement refers
to a prohibitive motion in limine seeking a preliminary order. For further dis-
cussion of the types of motions in limine, see text accompanying notes 22-28 infra.
9. Wagner v. Larson, 257 Iowa 1202, 136 N.W.2d 312 (1965).
10. Davis, supra note 5, at 234. E.g., in Burrus v. Silhavy, 155 Ind. App.
558, 563-64, 293 N.E.2d 794, 797 (1973), the court stated:
A "motion in limine" is not a creature of statute nor is it found in the
Indiana Rules of Procedure. The authority of the trial court to entertain
a "motion in limine" emanates from the inherent power of the trial court
to exclude or admit evidence in the furtherance of its fundamental con-
stitutional purpose which is the administration of justice ... A "mo-
tion in limine" is a necessary adjunct to the trial court's inherent power
to admit and exclude evidence. The trial court may issue protective
orders against prejudicial questions or statements which could be ut-
tered before a jury and thereby prevent a fair and impartial jury trial.
Accord, Good v. A. B. Chance Co., 565 P.2d 217 (Colo. App. 1977); Proper v.
Mowry, 90 N.M. 710, 568 P.2d 236 (Ct. App. 1977); Fenimore v. Donald M.
Drake Constr. Co., 87 Wash. 2d 85, 549 P.2d 483 (1976).
11. The first reported case considering a form of the motion in limine was
Bradford v. Birmingham Elec. Co., 227 Ala. 285, 149 So. 729 (1933), where the
plaintiff sought to exclude any reference to his character by the defendant. The
trial court denied the motion and the Supreme Court of Alabama upheld that
ruling, stating that such action "would be wholly unjustified by, and in violation
of, all precedent, and an unwarranted usurpation of judicial power and au-
thority." Id. at 287, 149 So. at 730.
In spite of this initial setback, motion in limine practice is now widespread
in the United States. 20 Am. JUR. Taiws 450 (1973); Comment, 8 N.M.L. Rxv.,
supra note 5, at 214 (stating that at that time the motion had been expressly rec-
ognized in federal courts and in 16 states). Use of the motion is especially preva-
lent in Texas. Davis, supra note 5, at 234. Even the Supreme Court of Alabama,
which originally rejected motions in limine, has upheld the granting of such a
motion. Cain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 360 So. 2d 322 (Ala. 1978).
12. "Specific statutes are not required to authorize a motion in limine."
Good v. A. B. Chance Co., 565 P.2d 217, 221 (Colo. App. 1977).
1980]
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In Missouri, there are three possible sources of authority for the propriety
of a motion in limine. The first and foremost is that the motion in limine
is within the inherent discretion of the trial court.'3 Secondly, there are
two Missouri Supreme Court cases which recognize the motion.14 Finally,
Missouri Supreme Court Rule 62.01 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
16 may be cited as authority for motions in limine.15
13. See note 10 supra.
14. Rogers v. Fiandaca, 491 S.W.2d 560 (Mo. 1973); State v. Schleicher, 438
S.W.2d 258 (Mo. 1969). Rogers, noted chiefly for its interpretation of a portion
of the standing provisions of Missouri's wrongful death statute, RSMo § 537.080 (3)
(1978), presented a wrongful death action arising out of a one-car collision which
resulted in the death of all of the occupants. There were no eyewitnesses to the
collision nor did anyone see who was driving the car when it departed from the
home of one of the occupants. Consequently, there was substantial speculation as
to who was driving the car at the time of the accident. The plaintiff, having
settled his claim out of court and remaining in the action only to- defend the
counterclaim, offered a motion in limine to preclude the use of certain prior
inconsistent statements made by the parents of plaintiff's decedent to the effect
that decedent was driving the car when it left their house. The trial court
granted the motion and following the dose of the evidence directed a verdict
in favor of the plaintiff.
The Missouri Supreme Court upheld the decision, and stated that it "found no
error in the ruling and findings of the trial court." 491 S.W.2d at 565. Although
the court did not expressly approve of the use of motions in limine, its tacit
approval of the same provides strong support for their continued use.
Stite v. Schleicher involved a criminal prosecution for second-degree burg-
lary and stealing. In a footnote, the court stated that a pretrial motion to suppress
may be appropriate during the next trial to exclude evidence obtained during an
unlawful search of another's apartment. 438 S.W.2d at 261 n.4:
Although attorneys have used Schleicher as authority for the use of motions
in limine, its value as such appears to be limited. As previously stated, the motion
to suppress is to preclude the use of evidence which was illegally obtained, whereas
the motion in limine seeks the exclusion of prejudicial evidence, regardless of
the nminner in which it was obtained. See note 3 supra. In Schleicher, it appears
that the' court would exclude the evidence based on how it- was obtained, rather
than on the basis that its prejudicial value outweighed its probative value. Thus,
Schleicher is not convincing authority for motions in limine in civil actions. Its
use for- that proposition is not recommended, especially considering the avail-
ability of Rogers and other more persuasive authorities herein cited. ,
Motions in limine have also reached the Missouri courts of appeal on thrde
different occasions; however, these cases did not rule on the propriety of using
motions in limine. Moore v. Rolmo Corp., 575 S.W.2d- 859 (Mo. App., D.
Spr. 1978); Land Clearance for Redevelopment Auth. v. Massood, 526 S.W.2d
354 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1975); Glick v. Allstate Ins. Co., 435 S.W.2d 17 (K.C.
Mo. App. 1968).
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 provides in part:
In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for
the parties to appear before it for a conference to consider
(1) The simplification of the issues;
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents
,which will avoid unnecessary proof;
(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;(5) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a master
for findings to be used as evidence when the trial is to be by jury; [and]
(6) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action. .
This rule has been cited as authority for motions in limine in the follow-
[Vol. "45
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-When an attorney files a motion in limine, his primary objective is
to keep any reference to certain prejudicial evidence from the jury.'6
This eliminates the need for objecting to the offer of the evidence at trial,
thereby "preserving neutrality in the mental processes of the jury."' 7
Aside from precluding the offer of evidence at an upcoming trial, the
granting of a motion in limine may significantly enhance a client's bar-
gaining position for settling a civil action out of court.' 8
There are two additional objectives which an attorney may achieve
through the filing of a motion in limine, regardless of the outcome. One
of these objectives is to obtain insight into the opposing counsel's reason
for offering the evidence and his theory in support of its admissibility.' 9
Consequently, even if the motion is denied, one would have time to re-
search the opposing counsel's theory and to prepare another objection to
the evidence when it is offered at trial. Secondly, filing the motion will
help preserve a record for appeal. 20
The effect of motion in limine practice "has been to shorten the
trial,- simplify the issues and reduce the possibilities of a mistrial."2 ' Con-
sidering the existence of congested dockets in most jurisdictions, the posi-
tive effect of motions in limine may be the primary reason that many
courts are now accepting their use.
ing cases: Aley v. Great Atlantic 8 Pacific Tea Co., 211 F. Supp. 500 (W.D.
Mo. 1962) (provides strong authority for the use of motions ir limine in Mis-
souri .federal courts); Hertz v. Graham, 23 F.R.D. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Penn v.
Automobile Ins. Co., 27 F. Supp. 336 (D. Or. 1939). In addition, in states which
have patterned their rules of civil procedure after the federal rules, the following
cases have cited their respective versions of rule 16 as authority for the use of
motions in limine: Bradbeer v. Scott, 193 Cal. App. 2d 575, 14 Cal. Rptr. 458
(1961); Wallin v. Kinyon Estate, 164 Mont. 160, 519 P.2d 1236 (1974); Heath
v. -Board of Comm'rs, 40 N.C. App. 233, 252 S.E.2d 543 (1979).
Mo. R. Civ. P. 62.01 (a) is nearly identical to FED. R. Civ. P. 16. Considering
the similarity between the two rules, the above cited cases would support the
proposition that Mo. R. Civ. P. 62.01 (a) is authority for the use of motions in
limine.. 
16.. Hyatt v. Sierra Boat Co., 79 Cal. App. 3d 325, 337, 145 Cal. Rptr. 47,
54 (1978). ("The advantage of such motions is to avoid the obviously futile at-
tempt ta,'unring the 'bell' in the event a motion to strike is granted in the pro-
ceedings before the jury."); Good v. A. B. Chance Co., 565 P.2d 217 (Colo. App.
1977);. Burrus v. Silhavy, 155 Ind. App. 558, 293 N.E.2d 794 1973); People v.
Harris, 86 Mich. App. 301, 272 N.W.2d 636 (1979); Bridges v. City of Richardson,
163 Tex.'292, 354 S.W.2d 366 (1962); Fenimore v. Donald M. Drake Constr. Co.,
87 Wash. 2d 85, 549 P.2d 483 (1976); Davis, supra note 5, at 233; 20 AM. JUR.
TRiAis 450 (1973); Note, 35 MONT. L. REv., supra note 5, at 362; Note, 8 N.M.L.
REv., supra note 5, at 219.
17. 20 AM. JUR. TRwAis 450 (1973).
18. Id. at 451-52.
19. Id. at 450-51.
20. Stroud v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 112 Ariz. 574, 544 P.2d 1089 (1976); Orange
County Flood Control Dist. v. Sunny Crest Dairy, Inc., 77 Cal. App. 3d 742, 143
Cal. Rptr. 803 (1978) (appellant's motion in limine provided a sufficient record
to preserve his vague motion to strike for appellate review). See text accompanying
notes 46-69 infra.
21. Burrus v. Silhavy, 155 Ind. App. 558, 563, 293 N.E.2d 794, 797 (1973).
1980] 0
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Motions in limine may be divided into two major categories: pro-
hibitive and permissive. 22 The prohibitive motion in limine requests the
court to issue an order prohibiting opposing counsel and his witnesses
from alluding to the prejudicial evidence in any manner during any por-
tion of the trial proceedings. Conversely, the permissive motion in limine
seeks an order allowing the admission of potentially sensitive evidence
before it is offered at the trial.
Prohibitive motions in limine may request either an absolute or a
preliminary court order.23 The preliminary order is not a final ruling by
the court and serves merely to preclude mention of or reference to preju-
dicial evidence during any phase of the proceedings until the proponent
of that evidence receives the court's permission out of the presence of
the jury. An absolute order, however, is a final ruling by the court, and
the proponent may not seek the court's approval for the admission of the
evidence even if the offer is made out of the presence of the jury.
The permissive motion in limine has appeared in only a few reported
cases. 24 However, this form of the motion appears "to be nothing more
than a logical extension of the 'prohibitive' type" 25 of the motion, espe-
cially when one interprets the denial of a prohibitive motion as a- pre-
liminary ruling "favoring the admissibility of potentially prejudicial evi-
dence." 26
Although there is little authority directly authorizing permissive mo-
tions in limine, such authority did not exist for the prohibitive motions
forty years ago.2 T The federal courts appear to be the most promising
source for case law in this area. Expansive pretrial proceedings are' estab-
lished by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16;28 therefore, counsel should
22. 20 AM. JuR. TPAms 452-54 (1973); Comment, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J., supra
note 5, at 468.
23. 20 AM. JUR. TRIALS 452-54 (1973); Comment, 29 Amn. L. Rnv., supra
note 5, at 223; Note, 8 N.M.L. REv., supra note 5, at 216.
24. LeRoy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 878 (1965) (transcript of flight transmissions allowed in
wrongful death action); Hertz v. Graham, 23 F.R.D. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (allowed
depositions from a prior action which evolved from the same occurence); United
States v. Certain Tracts of Land, 57 F. Supp. 739 (S.D. Cal. 1944) (ruling that
comparable sales would be permitted, even though state law would prohibit the
same); Penn v. Automobile Ins. Co., 27 F. Supp. 336 (D. Or. 1939) (on retrial,
defendant was allowed to use the testimony that his expert witness had given dur-
ing the first trial); Maroco v. Ford Motor Co., 7 Cal. App. 3d 84, 86 Cal. Rptr.
526 (1970) (pretrial ruling on judicial notice was incorrect, but not reversible
error); Walters v. Kellam & Foley, 360 N.E.2d 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (indicating
that a pretrial ruling would have been appropriate to determine whether custom
evidence tended to prove a material proposition in the negligence case); Keeney
v. City of Overland Park, 208 Kan. 389, 454 P.2d 456 (1969) (suggesting, that
pretrial ruling on reasonableness of ordinance may be used). See generally Com-
went, 1977 ARiz. ST. L.J., supra note 5, at 468-70.
25. 20 AM. JuP. TMALs 454 (1973).
26. Id.
27. See note 11 supra.
28. See note 15 supra.
[Vol. 45
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not be timid about proposing a permissive motion in limine in federal
court.
Motions in limine ordinarily are written2 9 motions filed prior to the
selection of the jury.3 0 The decision as to the exact time for making the
motion is part of the moving party's overall trial strategy and should be
made only after determining the type of motion to be used, the type of
order to be sought, and the probability that the court will grant the mo-
tion.31 Whenever the motion is filed, a copy of the motion, along with a
notice as to the time and place where the motion is to be taken up,
should be served on the opposing party.32 The court will generally take
up the motion on a law day or at the pretrial conference.33
The motion in limine should be simple and concise and should state:
1. The basic issues that will arise in the trial;
2. What evidence the opposing counsel is likely to attempt to
offer;
3. Why that evidence is unduly prejudicial; and
4. That no remedial action taken by the court at the time the
evidence is offered could repair the damage which will be caused
by the mention of the evidence, i.e., that prejudice will be instilled
in the minds of the jurors.34
In other words, the motion must:
[Describe] the evidence which is sought to be excluded with
sufficient specificity to enable the trial court to determine that it
is clearly inadmissible under the issues as drawn or which may de-
velop during the trial, and... [that] the evidence is so prejudicial
29. A motion in limine may be oral, but the oral motion must be made on
the record. Frequently this is done in the pretrial conference. If the oral Erotion
is not made on the record, the making of the motion and the ruling on it will
not be sufficient to enable one to raise the issue on appeal.
30. Although there are no specific rules as to the form of a motion in
limine, it should generally conform to the forms used for other motions in the
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Fro. R. Civ. P. 7 (b); 10; Mo. R. Civ. P. 55.02, .26. See 20
AM. JUR. TRIALS 502-04 (1973), for examples of basic forms for motions in limine.
31. For instance, if the party who files a prohibitive motion in limine does
not expect to get a favorable ruling from the trial court, he may file the motion
early in the proceeding in order to discover the opposing counsel's theory for the
admission of the potentially prejudicial evidence. Once this discovery is made,
counsel will have until the time of the trial to prepare an attack on this theory
or to find other evidence to lessen the impact of the damaging evidence. How-
ever, if the moving party expects the motion to be granted, filing it too early
will give opposing counsel time to discover other theories for the admission of
evidence or to gather substitute evidence. See 20 Am. JUR. rRTALS 498-99 (1973);
Comment, 1977 Amiz. ST. L.J., supra note 5, at 449-50.
32. 20 AM. JUR. TumATs 501 (1973).
33. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 16, 78; Mo. R. Civ. P. 55.30, 62.01. Cf. Good
v. A. B. Chance Co., 565 P.2d 217, 221 (Colo. App. 1977) ("Here, the purpose of
the motion and the nature of the affirmative defenses asserted by Chance rendered
an evidentiary hearing on the in limine issues essential to an informed ruling
on the questions presented."); Lewis v. Buena Vista Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 183 N.W.2d
198 (Iowa 1971) (encouraged the trial court to hold evidentiary hearings unless
the validity of the motion in limine was obvious on its face).
34. See 20 Aiv. JUR. TRiALs 496-98 (1973); Comment, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J.,
supra note 5,'at 447-49; Comment, 29 ARx. L. REv., supra note 5, at 224.
1980]
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'in its nature that the moving party should be spared the necessity
of calling attention to it by objecting when it is offered during
the trial. 6
The'motion should conclude with a prayer requesting the court to make
a proper order instructing the opposing party, his counsel, and his wit-
nesses not to refer to the excluded evidence in the presence of the jury.3 6
The moving party's motion should be accompanied by a suggested
order for the court to direct to the opposing party and a memorandum
in support of the motion.3 7 The contents of the suggested order are
extremely important.38 A properly drawn order must satisfy several require-
ments. First, the order must specify precisely what evidence is to be ex-
cluded.3 0 Secondly, the order should state that the evidence is to be ex-
cluded for all purposes, including impeachment. Thirdly, the order must
state that the court's directives apply to the opposing party, his counsel,
and his witnesses.4 0 Finally, the order should state that it precludes all
direct and indirect forms of communication during all portions of the
proceedings. 4 1 An order drawn to meet these four requirements will pre-
clude the opposing counsel from successfully claiming that he was not suf-
ficiently notified of the court's decision and will preclude him from
getting evidence admitted through a loophole in a poorly drafted motion.4 2
The memorandum which should accompany the motion in limine is
equally important.4 3 This is counsel's best opportunity to convince the
35e Fenimore v. Donald M. Drake Constr. Co., 87 Wash. 2d 85, 91, 549 P.2d
483, 488 (1976). Accord, Bridges v. City of Richardson, 163 Tex. 292, 354 S.W.2d
366 (1962).
36. The author has not discovered any cases wherein the court order con-
tained sanctions for its violation. Although this is a common practice in pretrial
discovery orders, the same does not appear to have carried over to motion in
limine practice. However, there appears to be no reason why a' court could not
make such an order, since it certainly has the power to enforce its orders, even
to the extent of holding violators in contempt. See Charbonneau v. Superior
Court, 42 Cal. App. 3d 505, 116 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1974).
37. 20 Am. JUR. TRIALS 492-94, 500-01 (1973).
38. Bruder, Pretrial Motions in Texas Criminal Cases, 9 Hous. L. REv. 641,
653 (1972).
'39. In Lewis v. Buena Vista Mut. Ins. "Ass'n, 183 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa
1971), the court stated: "The motion should be used, if at all, as a rifle and not
as a shotgun, pointing out the objectionable material and showing why the
material is inadmissible and prejudicial."
40. In Dutcher v. Lewis, 260 N.W.2d 404 (Iowa 1977), plaintiff's motion
was granted; however, the damaging evidence came in during voir dire because
the court order did not include this portion of the proceeding.
41. Wagner v. Larson, 257 Iowa 1202, 136 N.W.2d 312 (1965).
42. See Dutcher v. Lewis, 260 N.W.2d 404 (Iowa 1977).
43. In Fenimore v. Donald M. Drake Constr. Co., 87 Wash. 2d 85, 91, 549
P.2d 483, 488 (1976), the court stated:
To enable the court to make such a determination prior to trial and
"out of context" the moving party should provide a memorandum of
authorities showing that the evidence is inadmissible. If the 'court does not
have the benefit of legal arguments, it can hardly be said to have abused
its discretion if it denies a motion asking it to rule on the admissibility of
evidence before it knows what the issues and circumstances are.
[Vol.. 45
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court the evidence is such that it not only should be excluded, but .that
it should be at least conditionally excluded prior to trial. Counsel is more
likely to receive a favorable ruling if his memorandum contains authorities
for the general use of motions in limine44 and authorities for the exclusion
of the particular evidence sought to be exduded.4 5
When an appeal is based on an evidentiary ruling, which necessarily
involves use of the trial court's discretionary powers, the appellant car-
ries a heavy burden of proof. Relief sought will not be granted unless
the trial court's ruling is shown to be clearly erroneous. 4 6 With this stand-
ard of review in mind, an attorney dealing with a motion in limine
must carefully construct the court record to preserve his right to appeal
any error that may occur at trial, if he should receive an adverse decision
from the trial court.4 7
Generally, the grant or denial of a motion in limine is not reversible
error.48 The error, if any, is committed only when the evidence is offered
at trial and improperly excluded, or conversely, when the evidence is im-
properly admitted over objection at trial.4 9 If the evidence is never
offered, neither party may appeal the ruling on the motion.50
There is considerable conflict among the various jurisdictions regard-
ing the requirements to preserve one's objection to the trial court's rul-
ing on a motion in limine. When the motion is denied, some courts
require the moving party to renew his objection when the evidence is
44. See notes 10-15 and accompanying text supra.
45. See notes 70-97 and accompanying text infra.
46. E.g., Bine v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 422 S.W.2d 623, 631 (Mo. 1968) ("A
trial court has considerable discretion in the exclusion of evidence, and unless
there was an abuse of that discretion, its action will not be cause for re-
versal .... ).
47. Counsel must be certain to raise this issue in his motion for a new
trial. Alamo Express, Inc. v. Wafer, 333 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Ct. App. 1960)(exclusion of evidence must be raised in motion for new trial). See Mo. R. Civ.
P.- 78.07, 84.13 (a).
48. Cantlin v. Pavlovich, 580 S.W.2d 190 (Ark. 1979); Jordan v. Ensley,
149 Ga. App. 120, 153 S.E.2d 414 (1979); Ory v. Libersky, 40 Md. App. 151, 389
A.2d 922 (1978); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. McCardell, 369 S.W.2d 331(Tex. 1963); Davis, supra note 5, at 233-34; Comment, 1977 Axuz. ST. L.J., supra
note 5, at 451; Comment, 29 ARx. L. REv., supra note 5, at 219.
49. Cantlin v. Pavlovich, 580 S.W.2d 190 (Ark. 1979); Ory v. Libersky, 40
Md. App. 151, 389 A.2d 922 (1978); Alamo Express, Inc. v. Wafer, 333 SAV.2d
651 (Tex. Ct. App. 1960) (motion for new trial must present exclusion of the
evidence as the error, not the granting of the motion in limine); Davis, supra note
5, at 233-34; 20 Am. JuR. TRIAls 510-11 (1973); Comment, 1977 ARIz. ST. L.J., supra
note 5, at 451; Comment, 29 Ain. L. REv., supra note 5, at 219.
50. Cantlin v. Pavlovich, 580 S.W.2d 190 (Ark. 1979); Ory v. Libersky, 40
Md.App. 151, 389 A.2d 922 (1978); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. McCardell,
369 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. 1963); Roberts v. Tatum, 575 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. Ct. App.
1978); Commercial Ins. Co. v. Lane, 480 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972); City of
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offered at trial,51 while other courts have no such requirement. 52 However,
even in Texas53 where the objection must be renewed, once the alleged
prejudicial evidence is admitted the opponent does not waive his objection
by offering explanatory testimony to lessen its prejudicial effect.54 Where
the case law regarding motions in limine is inconclusive, as it is in Mis-
souri, the safest practice would be to object to the offering of the evi-
dence, on the record, but out of the presence of the jury.
Where the motion in limine is granted, there is also a split of au-
thority as to whether the moving party must renew his motion by object-
ing if and when the court's order is violated.55 Some courts do not require
the moving party to make an additional objection to the sensitive evi-
dence.5 6 Other courts, however, do require a timely objection to preserve
the right to appeal and to dispel any claim of waiver of the objection to
51. Jordan v. Ensley, 149 Ga. App. 120, 253 S.E.2d 414 (1979); Campbell
v. Wilson, 143 Ga. App. 656, 239 S.E.2d 546 (1977); Simkins v. City of Davenport,
232 N.W.2d 561 (Iowa 1975); Twyford v. Weber, 220 N.W.2d 919 (Iowa 1974);
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. McCardell, 369 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. 1963);
Bridges v. City of Richardson, 354 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. 1962).
52. Fenimore v. Donald M. Drake Constr. Co., 87 Wash. 2d 85, 549 P.2d
483 (1976); Mixis v. Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Co., 26 Wis. 2d 488, 132 N.W.2d 769
(1965).
53. The majority of the case law concerning motions in limine comes from
Texas. For discussions of the history of motions in limine in Texas, see Burdick
v. York Oil Co., 364 S.W.2d 766, 770 (Tex. Ct. App. 1963); Comment, 1977 Amuz.
ST. L.J., supra note 5, at 451; Comment, 29 ARx. L. Ray., supra note 5, at 224-29.
54. Roosth & Genecov Prod. Co. v. White, 152 Tex. 619, 629, 262 S.W.2d
99, 104 (1953), where the court stated: "Nor can it be said that the objection was
waived by such defensive steps as the petitioner took by way of cross-examination
and explanatory testimony once the objectionable evidence was admitted."
55. Generally, violation of the court's order will only inject error into the
case, which may or may not be reversible error. However, two noteworthy cases
have suggested other sanctions. In Charbonneau v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 3d
505, 116 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1974), counsel was held in contempt of court. The court
stated: "While a counsel has every right to protest rulings which he believes to
be erroneous, he has no right to willfully disobey with impunity a valid order
of the court." Id. at 514, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 160. In Burdick v. York Oil Co., 364
S.W.2d 766 (Tex. Ct. App. 1963), the court simply reversed the case because of
the actions of the defense counsel who criticized the plaintiff for exercising his
federally-granted privilege to withhold matters from his Veterans Administration
record. In all, counsel violated the court's various rulings and instructions 38 times.
The court observed that: "This was accomplished, not by indirection or an in-
advertent mistake, it was the calculated theory of trial." Id. at 767. In addition
to reversing the judgment, the court indicated that counsel's conduct was in
violation of the profession's legal standards.
56. In Stroud v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 112 Ariz. 574, 575, 544 P.2d 1089, 1090
(1979), the court stated: "A properly made motion in limine will preserve appel-
lant's objection on appeal without need for further objection if it contains
specific grounds for the objection...." (quoting State v. Briggs, 112 Axiz. 379,
542 P.2d 804 (1975)). In Fenimore v. Donald M. Drake Constr. Co., 87 Wash.
2d 85, 89, 549 P.2d 483, 486-87 (1976), the court stated: "Pretrial motions to ex-
clude evidence are designed to simplify trials and avoid the prejudice which oc-
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the evidence.57 Although Texas courts require the objection to be renewed,
this renewal does not necessarily cure the violation.58 In other words, even
if the renewed objection is sustained, the violation of the court's order
could result in a new trial or reversal on appeal. Some courts have held
that in certain factual situations a proper admonition to the jury may
render the error harmless, and that failure to request such an instruction
may damage the offended party's position on appeal..- 9 For the practitioner
with no case law to guide him, as is true in Missouri, caution should be
exercised. Consequently, if the order is violated, the moving party should
ask the court for an on-the-record conference out of the presence of the
jury. The attorney should then object to the violation of the order and
the offering of the evidence and request the court to instruct the jury to
disregard any mention of the offensive evidence. If counsel believes his
case has been damaged beyond repair, he should also seek a mistrial.
If the motion in limine is granted, the prohibitive order is violated,
and the violation is properly preserved for appeal, one may still have to
confront the harmless error rule.60 If it becomes necessary to overcome the
harmless error rule, the favorable pretrial ruling is an indication "that a
judge at the trial level concluded that the evidence was so inflammatory
that its very mention should be suppressed to insure a fair trial."'61
Should the motion be denied, the record may indicate that the "trial was
tainted" 62 because the trial court allowed prejudicial evidence to come
before the jury from the start. Although the harmless error rule is not
always applied, there is insufficient authority regarding its applicability
to motions in limine in most jurisdictions to ignore this possibility.6 3
An attorney who is precluded from offering evidence because a mo-
tion in limine is granted should first object at the time the ruling is made.
57. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. McCardell, 369 S.W.2d 331 (Tex.
1963) (failure to renew objection held to be waiver of objection).
58. Burdick v. York Oil Co., 364 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. Ct. App. 1963).
59. Montgomery v. Vinzant, 297 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Ct. App. 1956). Cf.
Tate v. Gray, 292 So. 2d 618 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (proper instruction to jury
to disregard the question and answer was held to have properly corrected any
prejudice which had occurred from a slight violation of the court's exdusionary
order). Contra, Crane v. Woodbury, 41 Mich. App. 11, 199 N.W.2d 577 (1972) (op-
ponent of evidence excused from requesting limiting instruction); Lapasinskas v.Quick, 17 Mich. App. 733, 170 N.W.2d 318 (1969) (error was too prejudicial to be
excused, even with the trial court's limiting instruction).
60. Tate v. Gray, 292 So. 2d 618 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (harmless error
where slight violation was followed by proper instruction to jury to disregard the
question and the answer); Schoellmann v. Ammann, 352 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1962) (citing Condra Funeral Home v. Rollin, 158 Tex. 478, 314 S.W.2d 277
(1958)); Valdez v. Yellow Cab Co., 260 S.W.2d 715 (rex. Ct. App. 1953) (pre-
cedent for the harmless error rule in Texas); Comment, 29 Amx. L. Ruv., supra
note 5, at 225-26.
61. 20 AM. JuR. TRALs 451 (1973).
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Mo. R. Crv. P. 84.13 (b).
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In addition to objecting to the court's order, one should make an offer of
proof out of the presence of the jury 4 and show why the previously ex-
cluded evidence is relevant.6 5 This showing is necessary because the grant-
ing of a motion in limine is not in itself error.60 Finally, counsel must be
certain to preserve this error in his motion for a new trial.67
In spite of an adverse ruling from the trial court, one initially pre-
cluded from offering particular evidence may still be able to get similar
information before the jury during other portions of the trial. One pos-
sibility arises when the court order does not preclude mention of the ex-
cluded evidence during all portions of the proceedings or where the order
does not prohibit mention of such evidence by the opposing party, his
counsel, and his witnesses.68 The other possibility presents itself when
the moving party inadvertently waives the prohibitive motion in limine
by referring to the excluded evidence or by alluding to its absence6 9 If
one believes that the moving party has waived his motion in limine, it
would be wise to request the trial court to so rule on the record. There-
after, should the opposing counsel object to the offer of the previously ex-
cluded evidence and subsequently appeal the trial court's ruling on 'such
objection, the trial court's ruling as to the waiver would greatly enhance
one's position on appeal.
Resourceful attorneys employ motions in limine in numerous situa-
tions. "Only a lack of imagination on the part of counsel will limit the
situations in which a motion in limine may legitimately be employed."o
The following is a discussion of some situations where motions in limine
may be successfully utilized in civil litigation.7 1
Motions in limine are frequently offered to prohibit the introduction
of prejudicial evidence which specifically affects liability. For instance,'mo-
tions in limine have been used to preclude reference to a defendant's traf-
64. See cases cited note 5 supra. However, it has been noted that such an
offer of the previously excluded evidence is not necessary when the court has
issued an absolute prohibitive order. 20 AM. JUR. TMuAS 508 (1973). .
65. In Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Finney, 346 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Ct. App. 1961),
the court held that the offering party had the burden of proving the relevance of
the excluded evidence.
66. See notes 48-50 and accompanying text supra.
67. See note 47 supra.
68. In Dutcher v. Lewis, 260 N.W.2d 404 (Iowa 1977), the court granted
plaintiff's motion in limine to preclude mention of her remarriage during the
trial for the wrongful death of her former husband. During voir dire, defense
counsel made reference to plaintiff's new married name. However, this was not
error because the court order did not encompass the voir dire examination.
69. United States v. Fishel, 324 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
70. 20 AM. JUR. TRius 458 (1973).
71. Additional examples and authorities may be found in Davis, supra note
5, at 234-39; Traster, supra note 5, at 152-64; Comment, 1977 Amz. ST. L.J., supra
note 5, at 452-68; 20 Am. JUR. TRIALs 458-79 (1973).
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fic citations,72 post-accident repairs, 73 and settlement offers7 4 as evidence
of liability. Defendants have also been prevented from referring to a prior
finding of negligence of a third party.75
Motions in limine are also used to prohibit evidence that may affect
damages. These situations include prohibiting plaintiff's counsel from
referring to defendant's insurance coverage 6 and prohibiting defendant's
counsel from referring to any compensation which plaintiff may have
derived from collateral sources, 7 or to certain family relationship such as
a subsequent remarriage.7 8 Motions in limine have also been granted in
condemnation cases79 to prevent reference to the possibility of future
72. Kyser v. Porter, 261 Ark. 351, 548 S.W.2d 128 (1977); Schoellmann v.
Ammann, 352 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Ct. App. 1962) (defendant's motion in limine
granted to preclude reference to fine assessed against him for failure to yield
right-of-way during the personal injury action which arose from his automobile
intersectional collision with plaintiff); Montgomery v. Vinzant, 297 S.W.2d 350
(Tex. Ct. App. 1956) (during a personal injury action arising out of automobile
intersectional collision, defendant's motion in limine was granted to preclude
reference to defendant being charged with aggravated assault, where such charge
was later dismissed).
Kyser presented a personal injury action where it was alleged that the de-
fendant son was negligent in the operation of his father's car, and the father's
estate was liable for the father's negligent entrustment of the automobile to the
son. The estate conceded that a finding of negligence on the part of the son
would be imputed to it. With the negligent entrustment issue settled, the court
granted the defendant-son's motion in limine to preclude reference to his past
driving record. The court of appeals held that such evidence was now irrelevant
and was properly excluded. The result of Kyser may well have been different
had plaintiff sought punitive damages.
73. Roosth & Genecov Prod. Co. v. White, 152 Tex. 619, 262 S.W.2d 99
(1953).
74. Cantlin v. Pavlovich, 580 S.W.2d 190 (Ark. 1979); Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co. v. McCardell, 369 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. 1963); McClintock v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 393 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Ct. App. 1965); Bridges v. City of Richardson,
349 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Ct. App. 1961).
75.: .Roadmacher v. Cardinal, 264 Minn. 72, 117 N.W.2d 738 (1962).
76.. Ferguson v. Graddy, 263 Ark. 413, 565 S.W.2d 600 (1978); Burrus v.
Silhavy, 155 Ind. App. 558, 293 N.E.2d 794 (1973); Mixis v. Wisconsin Pub. Serv.
Co., 26 Wis. 2d 488, 132 N.W.2d 769 (1965).
. 77., Wagner v. Larson, 257 Iowa 1202, 136 N.W.2d 312 (1965) (social
security and other pension benefits); McClintock v. Travelers Ins. Co., 393
S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Ct. App. 1965) (unemployment compensation); Burdick v.
York Oil Co., 364 S.W.2d 766 (rex. Ct. App. 1963) (veteran's benefits); Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Finney, 346 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Ct. App. 1961) (veteran's bene-
fits).
78. Leaseco, Inc. v. Bartlett, 257 So. 2d 629 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (in
action for wrongful death of former spouse, plaintiff's motion in limine granted
to exclude evidence of subsequent remarriage). Accord, Dutcher v. Lewis, 260
N.W.2d 404 (Iowa 1977); Bell Aerospace Corp. v. Anderson, 478 S.W.2d 191
(Tex. Ct. App. 1972).
79. United States v. Certain Tracts of Land, 57 F. Supp. 739 (S.D. Cal.
1944) (ruling on permissive motion in limine that comparable sales could be used
in federal condemnation action in spite of California law to the contrary); Fritz
v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 270 N.W.2d 835 (1978) (excluded evidence of
1980],
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hazards8 0 and to the difficulty of access to adjoining, but :otherwise unaf-
fected, land. 81
Certain matters adversely affecting a party's credibility have been ex-
cluded by motions in limine. Examples of this type of excluded evidence
include: prior or subsequent injuries that are irrelevant to the injury
involved in the suit or reference to claims, settlements, or payments re-
lating to those irrelevant injuries; 82 prior lawsuits, to prevent the implica-
tion that the plaintiff is a professional litigant;8 3 a party's prior criminal
record 84 or bad acts; 85 the use of alcohol or drugs;8 6 and immoral con-
duct.87
In addition to the foregoing examples, motions in limine have been
or may be properly employed in the following situations to preclude:
unnecessary cumulative offerings of evidence;8 8 introduction of irrele-
compensation awarded to fee owner in condemnation action against leaseholder);
City of Corpus Christi v. Nemec, 404 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. Ct. App. 1966) (excluded
evidence of an easement over drainage ditch that city could, at its will, grant to
the condemnee as evidence of special benefits to, remainder of his now severed
property). However, in Pan American Gas Co. v. Lobit, 450 S.W.2d 877 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1969), the court denied the condemnor's motion in limiine to preclude
reference to easements obtained from other landowners.
80., Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Reed, 215 Cal. App. 2d 60,
29 Cal. Rptr. 847, modified on other grounds, 217 Cal. App. 2d 611, 31 Cal.
Rptr. 754 (1963).
81.- State v. Baker Bros. Nursery, 366 S.W.2d 212 (rex. 1963) (circuity of
travel).
82. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Murphree, 163 Tex. 534, 357 S.W.2d
744 (1962); Burdick v. York Oil Co., 364 S.W.2d 766 (rex. Ct. App. 1963);
McCardell v. Hartford Accident & Indemn. Co., 360 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. Ct. App.
1962); Goodell v. ITT-Federal Support Servs., Inc., 89 Wash. 2d 488, 573 P.2d
1292 (1978).
83. McClintock v. Travelers Ins. Co., 393 S.W.2d 421 (rex. Ct. App. 1965).
84. Wagner v. Larson, 257 Iowa 1202, 136 N.W.2d 312 (1965); McClintock. v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 393 S.W.2d 421 (rex. Ct. App. 1965). Cf. Ayers v. Christian-
sen, 222 Kan. 225, 564 P.2d 458 (1977) (in civil -suit for battery, plaintiff's
motion in limine was granted to preclude defendant from mentioninz that he was
not criminally prosecuted).
85. Aley v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 211 F. Supp. 500 (W.D. Mo.
1962); Cain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 360 So. 2d 322 (Ala. 1978) (husband's ex-
tramarital affairs properly excluded in suit on life insurance policy, since they
were not relevant to deceased wife's mental capacity at the time* that she changed
beneficiaries in her life insurance policy); McClintock v. -Travelers Ins. Co., 393
S.W.2d 421 (rex. Ct. App. 1965).
86. Bradbeer v. Scott, 193 Cal. App. 2d 575, 14 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1961); Cook
v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 414 Pa. 154, 199 A.2d 446 (1964).*
87. Cain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 360 So. 2d 322 (Ala. 1.978); Carlock v.
Southeastern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 8 Fed. R. Serv. 16.261, Case 1 (E.D. Tenn.
1944). Contra, Bradford v. Birmingham Elec. Co., 227 Ala. 285, 149 So. 729 (1933).
88. Independent Iron Workers, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 322 F.2d
656 (9th Cir. 1963). Cf. Goodell v. ITT-Federal Support Servs., 'Inc., 89 Wash.
2d 488, 573 P.2d 1292 (1978) (court cited cumulative nature of the potentially
relevant evidence that was excluded in motion in limine as one reason for not
reversing the trial court).
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vant issues,3 9 evidence, 90 or statutory presumptions; 91 and presentation of
witnesses for purely prejudicial effect. 92 Motions in limine have also been
successfully used to preclude mention of: documents- 'which are extremely
prejudicial; 93 privileged matters; 94 press publicized matters; 95 sensitive
89.. Kyser v. Porter, 261 Ark. 351, 548 S.W.2d 128 (1977) (negligent entrust-
ment); Good v. A. B. Chance Co., 565 P.2d 217 (Colo. App. 1977) (precluded
evidenceon issues of plaintiff's contributory negligence and assumption of the
risk in products liability action); Fritz v. Iowa: State Highway Comm'n, 270
N.W.2d 835 (Iowa 1978) (compensation awarded to fee owner was excluded as
irrelevant in condemnation action against the leaseholder); Wagner v. Larson,
257 Iowa 1202, 136 N.W.2d 812 (1965) (marital difficiilties' excluded as irrelevant
in personal injury action); Ayers v. Christiansen, 222 Kan. 225, 564 P.2d 458 (1977)
(plaintiff's motion granted in civil battery action to preclude defendant from
mentioning that he was not criminally prosecuted); Lapasinskas v. Quick, 17
Mich. App. 733, 170 N.W.2d 318 (1969) (motion in limine should have been
directed toward defendant to preclude evidence of parental contributory fault in
child's cause of action); Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 570 P.2d 138 (1977)
(motion in limine properly granted to exclude seatbelt defense). But see Lewis
v. Buena Vista Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 188 N.W.2d 198 '(Iowa 1971) (motion in limine
improperly used to choke off -arson defense); Carrithers v. Jean's Ex'r, 259 Ky.
20, 81. SW.2d 857 (1935).
90. Aley v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 211 F. Supp. 500 (W.D. Mo.
1962); Fritz v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 270 N.W.2d 835 (Iowa'1978) (evi-
dence 'of compensation awarded to fee owner was excluded' as- irrelevant in
condemnation action against leaseholder); Febert v. Upland Mut. Ins. Co., 222
Kan. 197, 563 P.2d 467 (1977) (in action for recovery on a fire insurance policy,
plaintiff's motion in limine was granted to preclude defendant from offering
evidence of vandalism); Crane v. Woodbury, 41 Mich. App. 11, 199 N.W.2d 577(1972) (evidence of plaintiffs alleged speeding should have been excluded by the
trial court since such conduct occurred approximately three miles from the point
of the accident); Casey v. Texgas Corp., 361 So. 2d 498 (Miss. 1978). But see
Thomas v. Guerrero, 285 Or. 95, 589 P.2d 1112 (1979) (not error for trial
court to deny motion in limine and admit evidence that defendant may have
been drinking, and evidence that he left the scene of the accident; however, puni-
tive damages were at issue and the court stressed that it still looked upon motions
in limine with disfavor).
91. Ross v. Alexander, 74 Mich. App. 666, 254 N.W.2d 605 (1977) (de-
fendant's motion in limine successfully precluded admission of his violation of
city ordinance pertaining to vehicular-weight restrictions thereby eliminating
plaintiffs negligence per se claim that arose when plaintiff ran into the back
of defendant's parked truck); O'Neil v. Kappesser, 40 Misc. 2d 848, 243 N.Y.S.2d
712 (Sup. Ct. 1963); 20 AM. JUR. TRmis 461-62 (1973).
92. 20 Am. Jur. Ta Js 462-63 (1973). However, this theory was rejected
in Nielsen v. Brown, 232 Or. 426, 374 P.2d 896 (1962) (the court's disapproval of
motions in limine in general was obvious).
93. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Frank, 227 F. Supp. 948 (D. Conn. 1964) (ex-
cluding documented accident investigation reports because they contained opinions
and conclusions rather than factual matter); Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin,
3 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 16.261, Case 1 (N.D. Ill. 1960); Twyford v. Weber, 220
N.W.2d 919 (1974) (trial court properly granted defendant-doctor's motion in
limine to exclude certain inflammatory photos in'medical malpractice action).
. 94. Burdick v. York Oil Co., 864 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. Ct. App.' 1968). But see
McCoy v. Jones, 354 So. 2d 1095 (Miss. 1978), where the motion in .limine im-
properly extended the statutory physician-patient privilege to preclude questioning
the plaintiff's doctors about matters not covered by the statute.
95. Huff v. N.Y. Cent. R. (1961), reported unofficially in 12 Dxrxrsx L.J.
310, aff'd without reaching the issue, 116 Ohio App. 32, 21. Ohio Op. 2d 257,
186 N.E.2d 478 (1961).
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terms; 06 and the fact that parties were previously dismissed or severed
from the current litigation.0 7
The motion in limine may be the best method of ruling on the ad-
missibility of potentially prejudicial evidence. The attorney who success-
fully employs the motion has protected his case from prejudicial evidence
and has enhanced his bargaining position. Even if the motion is denied,
counsel has gained insight into his opponent's case and has helped pre-
serve his objection for appeal.
Another obvious advantage to the use of a motion in limine is that
it gives the trial judge more time to rule on a difficult question of evidence.
The trial judge is not "on the spot" as much as he is when he has to
make an immediate ruling at the trial itself. Since the judge has more
time to consider the question, he is more apt to decide correctly.
S'The bottom line is that motions in limine benefit both coungel and
the judiciary. The length of the trial proceedings are reduced, and the
courts are allowed to make more informed rulings on difficult evidentiary
questions. The likelihood of a mistrial or a reversal on appeal is thereby
diminished considerably. Although motions in limine will not solve all
of the problems associated with sensitive evidentiary rulings, their use in
appropriate situations is a progressive step toward fair and efficient judicial
proceedings.
JOHNNY K. RICHARDSON
96. Cook v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 414 Pa. 154, 199 A.2d 446 (1964)
(motion granted to preclude reference to the "Crazy Bar," which was the name
of the establishment nearest the scene of the accident, where there was no evidence
that plaintiff had been in said bar or drinking). Contra, Liska v. Merit Dress De-
livery, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 285, 250 N.Y.S.2d 691 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (motion in limine to
preclude use of terms "whiplash" and "whiplash injury to the neck" was denied).
97. Lapasinskas v. Quick, 17 Mich. App. 733, 170 N.W.2d 318 (1969);
Bridges v. City of Richardson, 349 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Ct. App. 1961).
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